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Security issues have played an important role in widening the European Union with eight 
Central and Eastern European economies. The time since have proved these concerns to 
be correct. The present North-South tension within the Euro-zone highlights even more 
the West-East tensions inherent in the international relations since the Eastern 
enlargement. Various divisions – political and economic alike – have already been felt 
throughout the whole period of 2004-2012
2
 (Balázs, J.1985, 1993, 1995, 1996). The 
worldwide economic crisis of 2008, however, has revealed even more the hidden tensions 
in these relations. The political events after the 2010 election in Hungary, those in 
Romania in 2012, the continuous anti-EU declarations of the Czech president present 
ample evidence to the fact: the enlargement has been based more on political wishes and 
will than on firm economic reasoning. The outcome is constant struggle between the 
parties to keep face and save the state of the European Union. Ongoing political and 
economic struggles around Greece, Portugal and Spain are other forms of fundamental 
problems within the European Union.  It is worthwhile, hence to study the almost 
forgotten centre – periphery relations in this respect. 
 
It goes without saying that proper understanding of the very causes and underlying forces 
of strained centre-periphery relations might contribute to a proper political response to the 
challenges involved. Notwithstanding, the world economic crisis has caused immense 
damage for Europe as a whole and for the individual member countries, as well. These 
harsh effects, however, have shed lights on the improper preparation of the European 
Community, the overemphasis put on the security and political aspects in the 1970s, 
1980s and the neglect of other forms of capital, explained below. Four years in the crisis 
is a long time. Long enough to generalise the experiences, to draw the conclusions on 
which a more prosperous system of relations could be established between West and East.  
 
The metaphor of centre and periphery can and has been used for describing mutual – 
perhaps unequal – relationships between two different entities. True, its contemporaneous 
form was given by economists specialised in development inequalities (Amin, 1973, 
Wallerstein, 1974). 
The concept has registered a particular success at the global level, as an equivalent of the 
“developed world / underdeveloped world” or “North / South”, “European centre/ Eastern 
periphery” pairs. This concept has thus been mostly used in the context of third-worldist 
thinking. This is an excessively restrictive use of a much more efficient notion. To think 
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 The present paper is a modified and enlarged version of the author’s study „Centre-periphery relations 
between Western and Eastern Europe” , prepared for the closing conference „Centre-periphery relations in 
a global world”, organised by Sorbonne III., Paris, December 12-13 1012. 
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 Judith Balázs has called for proper attention of economy as a security elements in her early publications. 
See especially Balázs, J (1985, 1993, 1995, 1996) 
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in terms of centre(s) and periphery(ies) allows reflecting on interactions between places 
in the World : links of reciprocal dependency where inequalities are the rule, but which 
are not working one-way. Symmetrical and asymmetrical interactions are part and parcel 
of world economic relations (Szentes, 2002), among them of those between Western and 
Eastern member states of the European Union. In this paper we confine ourselves to the 
relations within the European Union, between old and new member countries, neglecting 
the already mentioned frictions between the Northern and Southern member states. 
As Szentes has argued (Szentes, 2002) relationships between two types of parts of the 
world economy, thus flows and these relationships are asymmetrical. The centre is central 
precisely because it benefits from this inequality and, in turn, the periphery(ies) is(are) 
characterised by a deficit which maintains its(their) dominated position. The hereby 
described system is auto-regulated : the centre reproduces conditions for its centrality and 
the periphery does the reverse. However, precisely because it is based on logic of 
(unequal) exchange, the system is dynamic. Whereas some peripheries may become 
“dead ends” (they are then said « abandoned »), others may benefit from their situation 
(advantage on the long-run because of a greater size, of a location in contact with the 
outside of the spatial system); this can generate either polarity reversals in a logic that 
remains globally identical or the  system changes. 
The centre/periphery model has thus a robust heuristic potential, provided it is not 
overused. Its use should be reserved to formalisation of any system based on inequality 
relationships. However, abstract references of the reflections below to the ‘centre’ and the 
‘periphery’ defined for example – using the language of Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1986, 
Bourdieu 1998) – in conventional ‘fields’ of social interaction, seem also to be possible. 
Traditional ‘centre-periphery’ models usually focused on one of the selected dimensions 
of spatial relationships: economic, political or cultural. Classical economic theories 
include for example ‘the world system’ theory by Emanuel Wallerstein (e.g. Wallerstein 
1974), which divided the world into four basic categories: core, semi-peripheries, 
peripheries and external areas not included in the world system. In his theory, Wallerstein 
emphasised the economic dominance of the core over the peripheries as well as the 
weakness, non-stability and dependence of the latter on the core centres. Another area of 
the studies on the centre-periphery relations which is important from a theoretical point of 
view includes research concerning the emergence of modern nation-states and 
development of their political systems. Stein Rokkan is a classic researcher in this field, 
known for many theoretical papers on centre-periphery cleavages perceived in terms of 
political and cultural dimensions (e.g. Lipset, Rokkan 1967). The centre here is 
understood as the centre of political dominance which uses the state machinery to 
subordinate the entire territory of the country (region) to itself. Provinces/regions resisting 
these activities are the peripheries proper. In his studies, Rokkan also emphasized the 
important cultural dimension of the centre-periphery tensions. A modern nation-state 
makes an attempt to subordinate the sphere of culture to itself. In particular, it 
standardises the national language, and has ambitions to control the media. These 
aspirations are resisted by peripheral regions disagreeing to give up their cultural and 
religious distinctiveness. Significantly enough, the culture and religion spheres are largely 
of an instrumental character for the modern state, however, they are usually the key social 
resources for peripheral regions. (See Rokkan, 1970.) Another field of research 
concerning cultural relationships includes studies on the rebirth of regionalisms in 
postmodern nation-states. They highlight the significant role played by the cultural 
identity of periphery inhabitants and their occasional strong perception of the centre’s 
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cultural dominance (Keating, 1988.) The intention of the model presented here is to 
demonstrate the combination of the very relationship between the centre-periphery 
relations and theoretical concepts drawn from other areas of social sciences.  
 
This paper aims at answering one question: what are the main motivating forces behind 
the centre-periphery relations between the Union and Central and Eastern Europe in a 
theoretical framework. In our approach the European Union, as the most important 
political and economic institution of the 27 countries in Europe will be seen as the 
“whole”, consisting of the centre – the 15 “old” member states -, and the periphery, 10 
countries so far
3
. The theoretical underpinning is not quite transparent, indeed. The 
European Union, though has all three branches of power, cannot be identified as a “state” 
in itself. The European Parliament is restricted (limited) in its legislative power: the main 
decisions come from the European Council. Hence, the decision making power of the 
European Union is not democratic (this is the so called “non-democratic deficit” 
principle). The historical development of the Union, however, developed certain types of 
relations between the centre – the institutions of the Union – and the periphery. Especially 
important in this respect are the “common policies”, where national decision-making is 
not possible
4
. Hence in these fields of intra-European Union relations the decisive role is 
assured for the central institutions of the Union. The uniqueness of these relations lies in 
the fact that the peripheral states themselves are part and parcel of the “centre” decision. 
That is to say, the centre-periphery relations have two distinct dimensions: first, centre-to-
periphery relations in the common policies, and second, a “joint” centre-
periphery/periphery-centre type of relations. In the latter the so called “divided decision-
making powers” play important role.5 Needless to say, due to this multi-faceted nature of 
mutual relations between the centre and periphery in the European Union a 
multidisciplinary approach is only capable to shed lights on the fundamental, though not 
always equal inter-relationships. 
 
2. VARIOUS FORMS OF CAPITAL IN  CENTRE-PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theory, and in particular his concept of the three basic forms of capital, 
may seem to be the common ground of various research fields concerning the centre-
periphery relations discussed in the paper. Next to the classical economic capital, he also 
distinguished social capital and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986). He defined the social 
capital as: the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition or in other words, to membership in a group which provides 
each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a credential 
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 Cyprus and Malta are not considered here as part of the Eastern periphery. 
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 The European Union enjoys exclusive decision-making power in the following fields: customs union, 
competition rules needed for the internal market, monetary policy for the euro-zone countries, common 
fishery policies, common trade policy. This exclusiveness regards the signing of international agreements, 
as well when this is prescribed by European common law, when this is needed for harmonious functioning 
of the Union, and finally, when this concerns common internal rules or their possible changes.  
5
 These joint  - European Union and national states – powers are as follows: internal market, issues of social 
policy delegated by the Treaty on the European Union, economic, social and regional cohesion, agriculture 
and fishery, environmental issues, defence of the customer, transportation, trans-European networks, energy 
issues, space based on freedom, security and law, common security risks in the field of public health. See 
especially the paper of Erzsébet KAPONYI in this respect. 
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which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. Needless to say, how well 
this concept fits to the European Union, as a centre. The Union provides the member-
states a “credential” – this is exactly the fact of membership – based on which various 
hopefully mutually advantageous relations are possible. Cultural capital comprises three 
main subtypes: ‘institutionalised’ cultural capital in the form of formal education; 
‘embodied’ cultural capital in the form of internalised cultural norms, including aesthetic 
competencies, manners, knowledge of high culture forms, etc, and ‘objectified’ cultural 
capital in the form of objects having cultural value. The three types of capital 
distinguished by Bourdieu are also the dimensions in which social status and hierarchy of 
two distinct regions – Western and Central and Eastern Europe - can be described. They 
seem to correspond to the dimensions of hierarchies between central and peripheral areas. 
Iván Szelényi has utilised the concept of the three forms of capital to describe the 
divergences between individual societies and their evolution. Especially in his well-
known book entitled Making Capitalism Without Capitalists, (Eyal, Szelényi, Townsley 
1998), Szelényi drew attention to the fact that individual societies may be described from 
the perspective of hierarchies of various types of capital. Along with the evolution of 
societies, the relative importance of these capitals as determinants of social status within 
the society will also tend to evolve. These forms of capital can be changed into each 
other. Consequently, in certain periods and in certain social systems, the possession of 
specific forms of capital (e.g. economic, cultural or social) may result in special 
advantages, while in other societies and other periods, the same forms of capital will have 
a marginal value, and persons treating them as the main resource will not able to acquire 
any significant social position.  Using these forms of capital we can describe the 
divergences between individual central member-states and those of the periphery of the 
Union and their evolution.  
 
Using Bourdieu’s and Szelényi’s works centrally planned countries could be described as 
fields with a dominant role of political capital which in Bourdieu’s theory is defined as a 
sub-form of social capital. However, collapse of the socialist systems may be described as 
replacing the political capital by economic capital. The role of the latter became 
particularly important after liberal economic reforms had been implemented in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Whether economic capital became the dominant 
capital in the societies of the region is still a controversial issue. As it seems, it definitely 
remains subordinated to the political capital in Russia and in several of the countries in 
the region. It is a fact, that due the two-decade long transition, important changes have 
been implemented in the relations between political and economic capital within these 
economies. Large, substantial capital transfers between the Union (centre) and the Central 
and Eastern European member states notwithstanding, the dominant form of capital in 
this relation seems still be the political capital.  Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (1998) 
emphasise a particularly privileged role of cultural capital in the countries of Central 
Europe, especially in Poland and Hungary. They believe that, for example, the conversion 
of political capital into economic capital (commonly known as ‘seizing the property rights 
to formerly state-owned assets by the nomenclature’) never occurred there in a pure form. 
Cultural capital was the catalyst of the process and only owners of this capital managed to 
effectively exchange their privileged social positions defined by the ownership of 
political capital in the communist era for significant economic resources after 1989. 
Cultural capital in this sense was the motivating power behind the new elite (Szalai 2007) 
in its strive for larger international role. The new political elites are the result of the 
combination of system-changing intelligentsia and the liberal, economic technocracy 
from the old system. (Szalai, 2011.) In order to establish the “real owners”, both groups 
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supported dynamic capital export from the centre, mostly from the European countries. 
By the mid 2000s, however, this group has firmly established its place and opposed the 
income-redistribution by the state in favour of foreign, mostly European capital. In short, 
owners of this cultural capital managed to improve their privileged social positions: they 
had started to grasp political capital, as well. In parallel to this change, the new elite 
started to oppose foreign direct investment in their economies, including large flows from 
the European Union. The real question is, however, will the new capital class be able to 
enliven local economies, or not. The results so far in this respect are not convincing, at 
all. The economic development in the region has not changed the semi-peripheral status 
of these countries: the foreign and domestic capital dominated sectors are separated, and 
even the domestic sectors are not vertically integrated into the national economy. Due to 
these multiple separations the various sectors of the economy cannot support each other.  
 
In the most developed Western societies (that is, in the core areas of the world system), 
the relations between economic and political capitals are rather ambiguous. The relation 
between the sphere of politics and the sphere of money is still disputed. Bourdieu  
claimed that the field of power was a dominant field in all societies since it could verify 
the principles of operation of all other fields. However, there are also opinions that the 
abovementioned statement by Bourdieu is no longer valid in the globalisation era since 
the phenomenon of globalisation may in particular be regarded as a revolutionary process 
whereby the importance of economic capital is increasing and the importance of political 
capital is decreasing, a symptom of which includes the dwindling strength of modern 
states versus multinational corporations. Interestingly enough, the Central and Eastern 
European states seem to move against this general trend, at least for now. Disillusioned 
by the meagre results of the two-decade long transition, several countries opted for an 
enhanced role for political capital, including in some economies (like Hungary) new 
etatism (partial renationalisation). Political capital is used in these cases clearly to change 
the rules according to which the economic field operates. 
3. COMPENSATION AMONG VARIOUS FORMS OF CAPITAL 
In view of these considerations we can say that economic capital in the theoretical model 
outlined here, especially in the globalisation era, may be defined as the dominating capital 
and also as the key resource of the world’s core regions. The contemporary centres are 
areas of a strong concentration of economic capital, and their social stratification system 
is characterised by the dominance of economic capital over other forms of capital as 
determinants of social status. In other words, the logic of economic capital may be 
described as the dimension of dominance, in particular the dominance of central areas 
over peripheries in geographical terms. At the same time, it could be argued that the 
peripheries very often use the strategy of compensation for their weaknesses to offset 
their dependence on the centre, in the economic dimension taking the form of advantages 
given to other forms of capital. In particular, one may discuss the reference to cultural and 
social capitals, mentioned earlier. For example, in the case of Poland cultural capital 
constitutes its key resource supposed to compensate for the peripheral status of the 
country and its deficit of economic capital in relation to the centre. On the other hand, 
contemporary Russia seems to be a country where political capital still remains the key 
capital compensating for the peripheral status and dependence on the central countries.  
Hungary, where economic capital has played an important role up until the 2008 world 
economic crisis, political capital started to “regain” fields of influence, regarding both 
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domestic and foreign owned parts of the economy. State power is enhanced in the interest 
of appropriate status and influence in the Union and in the world for the country.  
 
Here, one may to draw attention to one important aspect of the compensatory privileges 
of individual forms of capital. Privileged capitals will play a key role in external 
relationships of the peripheries both with central areas and areas located lower in the 
global hierarchy. In particular, one may indicate cases where the subsequent forms and 
sub-forms of capital are used by the subsequent levels of peripheries in order to 
compensate for their weaknesses against stronger partners and domination over weaker, 
subordinated regions. Russia and earlier the Soviet Union may serve as an example, 
which, as it has been mentioned above, may be described as a peripheral region in 
relation to the West, compensating for its weakness by an extremely strong privilege 
assured for the political capital position. Hungary is a particularly good example in this 
respect since it attempted to build its partial independence in the socialist period, mainly 
in the substantially changed economic dimension. The trust in the power of the Hungarian 
economic power, its status as a modified centrally planned economy, may be analyzed 
here as an ideology of compensation for the dominance of political capital by means of 
economic capital.  
 
In this context, it is worth emphasising that classical compensatory capital, that is cultural 
and social capital, are characterised by a lower degree of liquidity in comparison to 
economic capital, as well as by limited possibilities of conversion and a longer 
accumulation period. Economic capital, in turn, is by definition characterised by a 
maximum degree of liquidity and an immediate potential for exchange. At the same time, 
according to many economists observing the way the world economic system operates, 
peripheral areas are characterised not only by lesser resources of economic capital but 
also by a significant level of instability. Perhaps even the stability of economic systems 
would be a better measurement of the position of the centre and the periphery in the 
hierarchy than the mere degree of economic affluence. This observation is extremely 
important seeing the drastic changes in the euro-zone of the European Union, where 
members of the centre – such as Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain – could not preserve 
the much needed economic stability due to the world economic crisis of 2008. This way 
or another, fluctuations of the world economic system cycles include instability of 
economic capital resources in the peripheries, followed by instability of the economic 
elites in these parts of the world. Therefore, a way to ensure the stabilisation of the social 
position in such a structure is reference to capitals which are significantly less exposed to 
crises and sudden devaluation: in particular to social capital and cultural capital. Elites in 
peripheral countries (regions), building their status on these forms of capital, can ensure 
its stability in a much better way, since they are exposed to a lesser degree to economic 
cycles. This kind of development is visible during and after the financial crisis in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Relations between the new member-states and the Union have been 
strained by the unfolding crisis coming from the euro-zone. Not only face these countries 
additional hardships – such as downgrading by international credit rating institutions – 
because of the deep crisis in the centre but their domestic political capital has been 
affected, as well. The political elite fears further weakening of the economic capital 
gained in the last decade and voices unwarranted state support for foreign economic 
entities. At the same time, it can be said that the hard economic realities in the West have 
helped the amalgamation of local elites, especially in the sense of political capital. The 
criticism concerning crisis solution attempts in various central countries of the Union is 
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only one side of the coin. On the other side one must see the strengthening call for 
“national solutions” as if they were some panacea for globally initiated problems. 
 
4. THE DUAL SOCIAL WORLD OF THE PERIPHERY 
 
This strategy of the elite results in the creation of a dual social world in peripheral areas 
since the periphery creates its own systems of social hierarchies, which may be 
specifically described as systems privileging selected forms of capital with a 
compensatory function. However, social organisation logic is a dominant point of 
reference for the periphery.  
 
The multi-dimensional social world of the periphery very frequently leads to social 
tensions between clashing systems of values and logics of social stratification. In the 
‘critical’ perspective, most frequently connected with the leftwing social thought, such 
tensions are usually interpreted as an outcome of the dominance of the centre over the 
periphery, imposing the central system of values, institutions and language onto the 
peripheries. We will not dwell on this issue, we only indicate the existence of the above-
mentioned conflict of the social organisation logic. Its nature may be diversified and 
cause differences in evaluation, but its existence seems to be more or less inevitable to a 
smaller of lesser degree. The conflict in question usually does not manifest itself in the 
form of tensions between representatives of the centre – in this case the European Union - 
and the periphery – countries of Central and Eastern Europe -, but more often it takes the 
form of disputes among the inhabitants of the peripheries themselves.  
 
We may conclude that the social world of the periphery is characterised by a constant 
tension between various types of competing social logic. This tension often results in a 
dysfunction of peripheral institutions, which are frequently structured on the basis of 
examples drawn from the centre, sometimes simply copied from the ‘central’ context. In 
the peripheral context, in a different logic of social hierarchies and values, they often turn 
out to be dysfunctional or will unexpectedly modify their mode of operation, adjusting it 
to the environment. It sometimes turns out that they serve totally different social groups 
and other interests than those which should theoretically be the beneficiaries of a given 
organisational type. Sometimes, despite their partial dysfunction, they are kept as 
important elements of integration with central areas which formally require their 
existence or informally force the peripheries to maintain institutions compliant with the 
central standards. 
 
5. THE DISRUPTION OF PERIPHERAL ELITES 
 
The consequences of the above phenomena for peripheral elites are particularly 
interesting since it is these elites that can best perceive the multi-dimensional nature of 
the periphery’s social space. Ongoing relations between the European centre and Central 
and Eastern European periphery are loaded with important amplifications of various types 
of values. There is specific intermediation of social and economic life. In several findings 
some of the Central and Eastern European elites are much more eager to take over values 
from the centre than transmitting local values to it. This critical view of some of the 
Central and Eastern European elites could be regarded as one-sided; however, it shows 
the tension that is a part of life of the elites in peripheral countries. On the one hand, they 
act as the centre’s representatives in the periphery, and on the other as representatives of 
the periphery in the centre. These functions are performed by economic, political and 
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cultural elites in relation to the social fields which remain under their control. The 
periphery’s cultural elites can also be described using Bauman’s metaphor (1998) of 
‘translators’ that is intermediaries in the explanation of the two worlds in question. They 
attempt to describe the world of the periphery in the language of the centre, and try to 
describe the social world of the centre to the residents of the periphery in a language that 
they can comprehend (and especially via the media that they have access to). As above, 
the notion of language should be primarily understood in an abstract sense, often 
described as “discourse”. This involves a specific style, a sphere of social references and 
a certain linguistic and conceptual complexity. In addition to their ‘ancillary’ role, the 
periphery’s cultural elites can be accused of supporting the centre in achieving a symbolic 
domination over the periphery, that is, of imposing the centre’s cultural values on the 
periphery. In this function, the peripheral elites could be termed using the second of 
Bauman’s metaphors that he applied to intellectuals in the same work, that is, the 
‘legislators’ who impose values and cultural norms onto the periphery in the name of the 
centre.
6
 In this way, the periphery can be perceived as an area which gives undue 
privileges to cultural. This is one of the several reasons why democratic institutions in the 
periphery can have a much more ‘window-dressing’ nature than in the centre.  
 
As has been pointed out earlier (Zarycki 2000), one of the practically inherent features of 
peripheral areas is the division into a pro-periphery and an anti-periphery orientation, 
prevalent in most of the dimensions of their social space. In particular, this division 
applies to peripheral elites and is especially well visible in the sphere of politics. Unlike 
the core areas, in the peripheral areas disparities between social groups are defined in 
terms of the role of the external world (that is, the centre) in relation to the identification 
of their economic interests, cultural values and political concerns. In general terms, we 
could say that the ‘anti-central’ party in the periphery will by definition be a champion of 
enhancing the role of, and protecting those capitals which in a given region are regarded 
as the key resources, compensating for the region’s weaknesses vis à vis the centre. On 
the other hand, the ‘pro-central’ party will be a more or less radical proponent of 
subordination to the social logic of the centre and recognition of the hegemony of the 
forms of capital prevailing in the centre. As mentioned above, in the global scale, this will 
usually mean the logic of economic capital, whereas political capital can be regarded as 
the dominating form of capital in other contexts; however, such a role is unlikely to be 




6. COMMUNICATION CODES OF THE CENTRE AND THE PERIPHERY 
 
We should bear in mind that tools which have been developed as part of the so-called 
discourse analysis (e.g. van Dijk 2007) can be successfully used in the analysis of 
tensions between thus defined centre and the periphery. As mentioned above, the 
‘languages’ used by the centre and the periphery can be viewed as disparate codes of 
meaning. In such a context, and in the analysis of the discourse of peripheral elites in 
particular, the so-called code switching theory can be particularly useful. The dilemma 
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 In this respect it is of special importance how the voluminous legislation enamating from Brussels is 
looked upon by the Central and Eastern European elite. 
7
 An important exception could be argued for Hungary, where from 2010 on a deliberate attempt has been 
institutionalized to strengthen local political capital (and elite), against the rule-pressioning European 
Union. The outcome has been strong and time-to-time harsh clashes between Hungarian and EU politicians 
with several infringement cases started by the European Union. However, having seen similar moves on the 
part of Romania (and partly in Poland), the Union lessened the pressure in this respect. 
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connected with the choice of language (i.e. code) in which members of peripheral elites 
are to communicate, quite well pertains to the area of this specific linguistic concept. 
 
In view of the above, it is only natural that in the majority of contacts with representatives 
of the centre, members of peripheral elites will use the central code, and in contacts with 
representatives of lower social strata of the periphery, they will switch to the peripheral 
code as the only code which is understood by both parties of the interaction
8
. However, 
when members of the peripheral elite communicate with each other, the choice of 
language is no longer obvious. On the one hand, it is possible to recourse to the central 
code. Its definite advantage is that it leaves aside social hierarchies of the periphery, 
especially those defined in terms of social and cultural capital. If the parties involved in 
the interaction are not fully-fledged participants of the interplay in the social field of the 
centre, then the social hierarchies of the centre which are encoded in its discourse do not 
have any immediate applications to them. In such a situation, the discourse becomes in a 
sense an abstract neutral plane for communication, which in many cases can be regarded 
as its asset. On the other hand, differences might evolve in the degree to which the 
centre’s discourse has been mastered, or, more broadly speaking, the centre’s culture 
because it extremely seldom comes as wholly natural for members of peripheral 
communities. The individual who achieves a better mastery of the centre’s culture, and 
especially its communication code, will automatically gain an advantage over all other 
individuals. In many situations, this will be an unfavourable circumstance which will 
hinder reaching an accord. However, in other situations it may prove to be an asset, 
especially when individuals who are relatively better rooted in the central culture will 
want to emphasise their advantage. In extreme cases, a member of the peripheral elite 
may address representatives of peripheral lower classes (especially those who are defined 
in cultural terms) in a refined central code, even if the latter are not able to comprehend 
any of the communicated message. The only pragmatic message conveyed will be the 
stressing of the cultural superiority of the speaker, and the fact that such a discourse is 
literally unintelligible will in this case be seen as an advantage. 
 
Similar dilemmas appear when representatives of peripheral elites want to choose a 
familiar peripheral code for their internal communication. On the one hand, it can activate 
the entire spectrum of social and cultural indicators of social status in the local context. 
References to them, which are implied by the very use of the peripheral code, can create 
additional and unwelcome barriers to interaction. In certain circumstances, emphasising 
such social and cultural disparities may be intended in order to stress the social distance, 
especially when this is done by persons who are privileged in a given sphere. However, in 
many contexts the choice of the peripheral code may result in a reverse implication: it 
may reduce social differences and build a sense of community. It is so because reference 
to the peripheral code will automatically imply recognising the centre as the common 
‘meaningful alien’, which is often perceived more or less negatively. On the other hand, 
the peripheral code is a natural and fully internalised code for all representatives of the 
periphery, including peripheral elites. For this reason, using the code does not create such 
barriers as when communication is based on reference to an external code, which in many 
cases will be internalised by the members of a peripheral community to a varying extent. 
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These reflections could be summed up by a conclusion that communication based on the 
use of the central code will normally imply negotiations concerning status, relating to the 
extent the central culture has been internalised by the interlocutors. Communication based 
on the peripheral code will imply the process of a mutual evaluation of its actors in 
relation to the fields of compensatory capitals, mainly social and cultural capital. In 
practice, communication (especially between sophisticated members of the peripheral 
elites) will frequently be characterised by constant changes of the code, thereby stressing 
both the freedom of movement in the two social worlds and the distance towards the 
speaker’s own, multi-dimensional and ambiguous, social status.  
 
7.1. The centre as seen by the periphery 
 
As mentioned above, the centre will frequently profess its lack of prejudices or 
preconceptions vis-à-vis the periphery. In the centre, the domination of economic capital 
as a rule implies a much more impersonal attitude to member states in the periphery. This 
means that what matters in the centre is talent, skills and willingness for hard and 
competent work, and not social background. The centre, therefore, assesses the external 
world from the angle of economic capital. The centre’s special focus on the logic of its 
dominant capitals can lead to a specific bias in the periphery’s perception. In such a 
situation, the periphery is often viewed as obsessively clinging to its historical, cultural 
and social traditions. These dimensions of social life, especially in their peripheral 
manifestations, are the least attractive and regarded as insignificant in the world of the 
centre. This could reinforce the view of the ‘backwardness’ of the periphery and its 





The social hierarchies and divisions in the periphery based on cultural and affiliation 
criteria are very frequently regarded by representatives of the centre as expressions of 
Marx’s ‘false consciousness’. For the centre, the only ‘real interests’ are interests which 
are defined in the economic field, while other conflicts of interest tend to be perceived as 
aspects of the former. This is the reason why defining divisions in the political arena in 
cultural rather than economic terms, so frequent in the peripheries, is seen by the centre 
either as a manifestation of peripheral ignorance, naivety or ‘backwardness’, or as a sign 
of deliberate manipulation of the peripheral communities by the elites in their attempt to 
divert their attention from ‘real’, that is economic, interests. 
 
We could speak about the phenomenon of the ‘economisation’ of the periphery coupled 
with its concurrent ‘culturisation’. Whilst ‘culturisation’ would strive to focus the 
centre’s attention on the cultural dimension of the periphery, yet depicting it in a 
disorganised manner as a certain ‘curiosity’ and an aspect of mysterious exoticism, 
‘economisation’ is an attempt at a complete marginalisation of the cultural dimension. 
Such an approach may lead to the production of an utterly one-sided description of the 
periphery’s social reality, created in the language of the centre10.  
                                                 
9
 In this respect it is worth mentioning the frequent criticism towards the Central and Eastern European 
countries while they aspired for membership in the European Union. The Union (the centre) was confronted 
by long references of historical, cultural values of the periphery, which seemed unrelated to the issue of 
membership. The peripheral countries, however, used this language exactly for stronger conviction.  
10
 A well-known example of a study in one-sided analyses of the social world of the (semi)-periphery using 
the centre’s language is the work by Mouzelis (Mouzelis, 1986). In it, Mouzelis points out that narrowing 
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Even if the way the periphery is perceived by the centre is not overly fraught with 
‘economisation’ or ‘culturisation’, it can meet with critical reception in the periphery 
owing to the relativisation of the role of the periphery’s social and cultural capitals, which 
turn the universally recognised values into objects of research and criticism. A 
particularly good example in the sphere of academic discourse involves works 
underpinned by the broadly understood postmodernist paradigm. On the one hand, these 
works, focusing mainly on culture and symbolic linkages, highlight the relationships 
which until now were rather unobvious, also those between the centre and the periphery, 
such as the ‘culturism’ syndrome. They also help better appreciate the role of cultural 
capital (which is so significant for the periphery) in social science and beyond. However, 
while trying to enhance the status of the cultural field in academic studies or political 
debate, they do it in a way which mostly tends to relativise the periphery’s cultural values 
and assets. It is so because although the ‘deconstructed’ peripheral identities attract more 
attention, they are usually portrayed in the context which strips them of the status of 
absolute values they enjoy in the periphery. For researchers working from the centre (or 
members of peripheral elites who refer to the central discourse), peripheral identities are 
as a rule interesting social phenomena. Nonetheless, they tend to treat them as attention- 
grabbing illusions rather than entities having a real existence, comparable to that of 
economic capital, which has a much more ‘objective’ nature in the centre, unlike cultural 
identities. For residents of the centre, financial assets are the criterion which determines 
their social status. In such a context, the sphere of culture, as being of secondary 
importance, can be an arena of casual ‘games’ with identity, its deconstruction, 
reconstruction and mutations created at discretion and at will. Such ‘games’ are much 
more difficult in the peripheries, where cultural identity and group affiliation can be of a 
considerably more ‘objective’ nature than financial assets.  
 
What can we say about the future changes in centre-periphery relations in Europe? There 
is, first of all a danger that peripheral (semi-peripheral) economies will be detached from 
the centre. There are signs already that even with strengthening internationalisation (or, 
for that matter, with growing protectionism) the centre will attempt to distribute the 
burdens (costs) of the crisis on the periphery, much more so than ever before. However, 
secondly the pressures exerted by peripheral countries and regions on the centre might – 
slowly but surely – modify the behaviour of the centre in the West-East relations.  
 
Situation of the peripheral countries is further aggravated by their substantially weakened 
capital attracting capacity. This feature in this part of Europe is much weaker than in the 
centre. These economies do not have proper economic force to give security guarantees to 
the foreign direct investors, as this is requested by the latter.  
 
Finally, several Central and Eastern European peripheral countries have opened their 
economies, have used up their internal reserves in such measure that even with the 
strongest demand creating economic policy they will not be able to regenerate domestic 
markets.  
                                                                                                                                                  
the phenomenon of domination to the merely economic dimension is particularly inadequate in relation to 
countries which are outside the world’s core areas. In their case, other modes of domination should be 
distinguished which could, arguably, correspond to Bourdieu’s types of capital. Both authors concurrently 
called for expanding the Marxist analysis of social inequalities beyond the strictly economic dimension, and 




The situation of the European Union is insecure, as well. In the likely case that the 
leading elite will not refrain from utilising long gone neoliberal aspirations, Europe will 
immerse in a prolonged recession. Not only will forces integrating the Union from within 
weaken dangerously, but at the same time in the political and social structure of Europe 
unwanted changes might come to the fore. The same is true for Central and Eastern 
Europe. Here, not only is the defencelessness with regard to world economic 
developments greater but democratic traditions are much weaker than in the centre 
countries of Europe. A structurally – both in political and economic sense of the world – 
weakened Europe will not be able to instigate further catch-up processes in Central and 
Eastern Europe. This might bring severe consequences in both parts of the European 
Union. 
 
We can state therefore that the habit of an ironic treatment of the one-dimensionality of 
the central social world by the periphery, and the reserve manifested by its representatives 
to the economic field as the key determinant of social status, are matched in the centre by 
the ‘deconstruction’ of peripheral identities. While the centre regards peripheral cultural 
identities as a secondary and relative reality, and they are seen as subjective social 
‘constructs’ in the language of postmodernist social theory, the periphery – though it 
usually lacks its own independent and sophisticated language for social theory – tends to 
regard money as a relative social construct which tends to come and go, and yet the 
periphery’s basic social structures last on, regardless of economic crises and ‘ownership 
transformations’ in and outside the European Union. 
 
In view of the above, representatives of the central elites, who live in a comparatively 
one-dimensional social world, not only are unable to understand the periphery’s 
communication code, but also frequently have serious problems with grasping the very 
idea of the multi-dimensionality of the periphery’s social world. This seems to be the 
crucial problem affecting the way the periphery is perceived by the centre. In 
consequence, they are often viewed as strange and mysterious areas, and this perception 
can also extend to the departers from the periphery. On the one hand, such mysteriousness 
can be regarded as a positive feature which attracts attention, one which is associated with 
a higher level of ‘spirituality’ and ‘deeper’ culture that can be encountered in the 
periphery. On the other hand, however, such mysteriousness can be associated with 
backwardness, irrationality of the peripheral world, pre-modernity and superstitiousness. 
 
Accusations of hypocrisy, distrust, insincerity, inconsistency and reticence voiced by the 
centre against the periphery’s representatives can be seen as yet  another consequence of 
the centre’s inability to comprehend the multi-dimensionality of the social world of the 
periphery. At their best, the utterances and social behaviours of the periphery’s 
inhabitants, referring to disparate communication codes, will be seen by the centre as 
incongruous. Naturally, this list does not exhaust all the communicative aspects of 
problems which can appear in contacts between representatives of the centre and the 
periphery. It is to be hoped, however, that the problems discussed above convincingly 
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